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I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination is an omnipresent force in our society. The
faceless shadow rears its ugly head in a variety of places, and impacts
the lives of countless Americans every day. Tomorrow, for instance,
an African American woman will be turned down for a job because of
her race. The next day, an aging man will be replaced without
warning by a younger employee. Over the years, the legislature and
the judiciary have taken turns wrestling with the complex issues
created as a result of widespread discriminatory practices. During the
1960s and 1970s, Congress attempted to remedy some forms of
discrimination by passing the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).' Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court attempted to define a standard for evaluating all
discrimination cases arising under the rubric of Title VII employment
discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas standard.' This standard
requires plaintiffs to first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Then, assuming the first step is met, the burden shifts
to the defendant to state a non-discriminatory basis for the action
taken.3 Although the McDonnell Douglas standard was introduced in
the employment discrimination context, it has been adopted by courts
1.See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law
and Economics Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REv. 787, 802-03 (1995). The Fair Housing Act,
regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, prohibits discriminatory
conduct in residential real estate transactions. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605
(1994). Similarly, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, implemented by the Federal Reserve
Board, seeks to prevent discrimination in credit transactions. Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
2. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under the
McDonnell Douglas standard, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the plaintiff
belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was
trying to fill; (3) although qualified, he was rejected; (4) thereafter, the employer
continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications. See id. See also infra
notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
3. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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to determine discrimination in other contexts as well, including cases
addressing both age and disability discrimination. 4 Reconsider the
African-American woman mentioned earlier. What happens if she
applies for a bank loan and is refused? If she believes that her race
was a motivating factor in the decision, should the courts use the
McDonnell Douglas standard to determine whether the defendant's
actions were discriminatory, violating the FHA and the ECOA?
In Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, an African
American woman brought suit alleging credit discrimination in real
estate lending after the bank refused to issue her a loan based on the its
own appraisal of her current property.5 While the United States
Supreme Court has not yet heard arguments on this precise issue,6
there is a split in the courts of appeal over whether the McDonnell
Douglas standard is appropriate for credit discrimination cases. 7 This
Note will explore the facts and holding of Latimore v. Citibank
Federal Saving Bank in Part 118 Part III will examine the relevant
background law, including pertinent statutory and regulatory
provisions as well as holdings from other circuits.9 Part IV will
provide an analysis of the court's opinion in Latimore, focusing on a
discussion of conflicting opinions from the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits.' ° Finally, this Note will conclude that the Seventh
Circuit erred in its treatment of the Latimore case, and that the
4. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713 (71h Cir. 1998)
(applying the McDonnell Douglas standard to the facts presented in a loan discrimination
lawsuit); see also Coco v. Elmwood Care Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1178 (7"h Cir. 1997)
(invoking the McDonnell Douglas standard in a case concerning the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Leffel v. Fin. Serv., 113 F.3d 787, 792 (7 h Cir. 1997) (holding that
the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary standard is appropriate for plaintiffs filing complaints
under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
5. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712.
6. Thus far, the Supreme Court has declined the invitation to rule on a case
involving loan discrimination. It denied certiorari in both Ring v. First Interstate
Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924 (8"' Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1189 (1998), and Simms
v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5"' Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 610 (1996).
Counsel for the plaintiff in the Latimore case did not pursue certiorari.
7. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712 (holding that the McDonnell Douglas standard is
inappropriate in the credit discrimination context). For a contrasting opinion, see Simms
v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996) (allowing the McDonnell Douglas
standard in a credit discrimination context).
8. See infra notes 12-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-99 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 100-69 and accompanying text.
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McDonnell Douglas standard should be extended to apply in all credit
discrimination lawsuits. 1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank concerns the
applicability of the McDonnell Douglas employment discrimination
standard in the credit discrimination context. 12 Helen Latimore, an
African-American plaintiff, brought suit alleging discriminatory
treatment by defendant Citibank Federal Savings Bank (Citibank)
when the bank and its employees denied her mortgage loan
application. 13  Specifically, Ms. Latimore applied for a loan of
$51,000 using her current home as collateral for the loan. 14 In making
its decision, Citibank utilized a two step analysis to determine whether
Ms. Latimore satisfied its lending requirements. First, in accordance
with bank regulations, Citibank performed a routine credit check on
Ms. Latimore. s Upon finding that Ms. Latimore met the initial
creditworthiness requirement, the bank then analyzed the iatio
between the appraised value of Ms. Latimore's home to the amount of
the loan in question.' 6  In making its lending decisions, Citibank
employed the "75% rule," which simply requires a loan-to-value ratio
of less than 75%. 17 The bank's employee and appraiser subsequently
set the property value at only $45,000, yielding a percentage that
could not support the $51,000 loan requested by Ms. Latimore." Ms.
Latimore, however, obtained other loan appraisals that placed a much
higher value on her property. She forwarded the higher appraisals to
the attention of Citibank, but her application was declined again.
ii. See infra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.






18. See id. at 713. In order to borrow $51,000, Ms. Latimore's home needed to be
valued at or above $68,000. See id. With a property value of only $45,000, the loan-to-
value ratio amounted to 113%, which was clearly unacceptable under the 75% rule. See
id.
19. See id. Citibank and its employees rejected an $82,000 appraisal conducted less
than a year earlier on grounds that "the comparable sales on which the $82,000 appraisal
had been based weren't really comparable because they involved property more than six
1999] 235
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The plaintiff alleged discrimination on two grounds. First, Ms.
Latimore contended that she was discriminated against because her
property was located in a predominantly African-American
neighborhood.20 Second, the plaintiff found discriminatory motive in
the conduct of Citibank employees.2' Ms. Latimore contended that
Citibank employees went beyond the call of duty to assist white
borrowers in raising the appraised value of their property but did not
extend the same courtesy to her during her loan negotiations. 22 While
the district court and the court of appeals both ruled in favor of
Citibank, the two judicial entities used and applied the relevant laws in
different ways.
A. The District Court
In analyzing the facts presented, the district court applied the
McDonnell Douglas employment discrimination standard to address
the allegations of violations of federal statutes, including sections 1981
and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,23 the FHA,24 and the
ECOA.25 The district court held that in order for the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case, the following elements of the McDonnell
Douglas standard must be shown: (1) plaintiff was a member of a
protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for a loan; (3)
blocks from Latimore's home." Id. Ms. Latimore ultimately obtained a $46,000 loan at
a higher interest rate from another bank. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. Marcia Lundberg, an account executive at Citibank, handled Ms.
Latimore's application and later informed her that her property value would not support a
loan of $51,000. See id. Ms. Lundberg based her decision on the appraisal conducted
earlier by fellow Citibank employee, Ed Kernbauer. See id.
22. See id. at 715.
23. Title VII was originally used to address inequalities arising within the employment
relationship (i.e., refusals to hire minorities, pay disparities, etc.). See Swire, supra note
1, at 830.
24. The FHA states that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to
discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction,
or in terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994).
25. The ECOA distinguishes between activities that do constitute discrimination and




the loan was rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) the defendant
continued to approve loans for applicants with qualifications similar to
those of the plaintiff.26  After reviewing these elements, the court
concluded that Ms. Latimore had to show "that [Citibank] treated her
materially differently than similarly situated white loan applicants or
loan applicants from non-minority neighborhoods." 2 7
Upon examining the facts, the district court found no evidence
demonstrating a material difference in treatment. 28  The court first
focused on the actions of appraiser Ed Kernbauer. The plaintiff failed
to show that race was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to
deny her loan application based on Mr. Kernbauer's appraisal of her
home. 9 Indeed, Mr. Kernbauer had actually supported loan amounts
to other African Americans in the same neighborhood.30 Additionally,
the court failed to find discriminatory motive on the part of Ms.
Lundberg during the appraisal review process. 3' Thus, based on a
total evaluation of the evidence, the district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgement.32
B. The Court of Appeals
The plaintiff subsequently appealed from the district court
26. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 979 F. Supp. 662, 665 (N.D. I11.1997).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 668. In evaluating the evidence, the court also reviewed the findings of
the Community Reinvestment Act Committee. See id. at 664. In this case, the
Committee determined that denial of plaintiff's claim was consistent with Citibank's
general policies. See id. The stated purpose of the Community Reinvestment Act is to
"evaluate whether a bank's lending practices help 'to meet the credit needs of its entire
community, including [the] low and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with [the]
safe and sound operation of the bank.'" Craig E. Marcus, Beyond the Boundaries of the
Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based
Framework for Generating Low-and-Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710,
711 (1996) (citing Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 12 C.F.R § 25.7 (1995)).
29. See Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 666.
30. See id. The Community Reinvestment Act Committee noted that out of the sixty-
nine appraisals conducted by Mr. Kernbauer of minorities or in minority neighborhoods,
only three applicants were declined based on appraisal value. See id.
31. See id. at 668-69. The court did not accept plaintiff's contention that Ms.
Lundberg discriminated against her by not specifically requesting "comparables" during
the appraisal review process, since Ms. Lundberg did request a recent appraisal of the
plaintiff's property which contained information regarding "comparables." See id. at
668.
32. See id. at 669.
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ruling. 33  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit discussed the competing
motivations behind application of the McDonnell Douglas standard and
the suitability of the standard in this case and in other credit
discrimination lawsuits. The court first considered the competing
interests of each party. The plaintiff sought to utilize the standard in
an effort to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant, 34 while the
defendant attempted to use the standard as a device to poke holes in
the plaintiff's prima facie case by challenging whether Ms. Latimore
was even a qualified borrower.35 The court of appeals, however,
rejected both arguments favoring implementation of the McDonnell
Douglas standard. Instead, the court required a much narrower
approach requiring the plaintiff to present evidence of actual
discrimination on some forbidden ground, such as race. 36
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit articulated two
primary factors underlying its decision to remove the well-known
standard from loan bias lawsuits: 37 one procedural factor and one
substantive factor. First, the court stated its concern with shifting the
burden of proof onto the defendant before the plaintiff has produced
any evidence of her own, thus creating a regime where pre-complaint
discovery governs.38 Second, the court discussed the crux of its
argument, focusing on the absence of a competitive interest between
an African American consumer applying for a loan and a white
consumer applying for a loan.39 The court explained that "[Ms.]
Latimore was not competing with a white person for a $51,000
loan." 40  As the court noted, the lack of a competitive interest
differentiates the credit discrimination context from the employment
discrimination context where the McDonnell Douglas standard
33. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712.
34. See id. at 714.
35. See id. (explaining that to meet qualified borrower status, a plaintiff must meet the
lender's requirements for collateral first).
36. See id. at 715. The court noted that "it is always open to a plaintiff in a
discrimination case to try to show in a conventional way, without relying on any special
doctrines of burden-shifting, that there is enough evidence, direct or circumstantial, of
discrimination to create a triable issue." Id.






originated. In the employment relationship, for instance, where a
similarly situated black applicant is turned down in favor of a white
applicant, suspicious conduct triggering the McDonnell Douglas
analysis is easier to see.42 However, in a credit discrimination case,
such conduct is not as readily identifiable. Because of these factors,
the court declined to extend the McDonnell Douglas standard to credit
discrimination litigation.
III. BACKGROUND LAW
Lending institutions have recently attempted to address the
burgeoning problem of discrimination and to establish a uniform
policy against discriminatory lending.43 In 1994, a Task Force
comprised of various lending agencies gathered to create a basic policy
statement on the current state of the law entitled "The Policy
Statement on Discrimination in Lending." 44 The agencies developed
this policy statement to explain their interpretation of the ECOA and
the FHA in an effort to establish uniform policy for purposes of
administrative enforcement.4 5  Although the Interagency Task Force
certainly recognized the importance of other federal statutory law
addressing discriminatory lending practices, the statement only
addresses the ECOA and the FHA.46 In essence, the policy statement
41. See id.
42. See id. at 714.
43. Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found that blacks were still
denied loans almost 60% more often than similarly situated whites. See Swire, supra note
1, at 789 (citing Alicia H. Munnell et. al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting the
HMDA Data 2, (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, WORKING PAPER No. 92-7 (1992)). See
also Massive HUD 'Paired-Testing' Initiative, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Nov. 30, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File (quoting the Department of Housing and
Urban Development Secretary, Andrew Cuomo, who stated that "[A]frican-[A]mericans
are denied mortgages at twice the rate of whites.").
44. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (1994).
The Task Force was comprised of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Housing Finance Board
(FHFB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA). See id.
45. See id.
46. Although other federal statutes address fair lending, the Task Force focused solely
on the ECOA and the FHA because they specifically prohibit discrimination in lending.
2391999]
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provides guidance "to all lenders, including mortgage brokers, issuers
of credit cards, and any other person who extends credit of any type"
by detailing what the agencies will consider when determining what
constitutes a violation of the ECOA or the FHA.47
The Policy Statement begins with a concise description of the
primary discrimination statutes and regulations. "The ECOA states
that it prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit transaction"
that is based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, age, "the applicant's receipt of income derived from any public
assistance program and the applicant's exercise, in good faith, of any
right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act." 41 Similarly, the
FHA "prohibits discrimination in all aspects of residential real estate
related transactions" based on race, color, national origin, religion,
sex, familial status, and handicap. 49 Both statutes subject offenders to
civil liability for acts of discrimination in mortgage lending based on
any of the prohibited factors in the statutes.5" These two laws
specifically prevent a number of discriminatory lending practices
including discouraging applicants from applying for credit, using
different standards to evaluate collateral, treating a borrower
differently in servicing a loan, or discriminating on the basis of the
type of area where property to be financed is located.5'
The Policy Statement addresses various topics including second
review programs for loan applicants who are members of protected
classes, the appropriateness of self-testing in banking institutions,
corrective actions to take in the event self-testing reveals
discrimination, factors needed to prove a pattern or practice of lending
discrimination and perhaps most importantly, the criteria employed in
See id. at 18,267.
47. Id.
48. Id. (describing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)). The
ECOA follows the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation B that
outlines appropriate and inappropriate lending acts and practices. See 12 C.F.R. §
202.1(a) (1998).
49. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1994). The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) regulates the FHA. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.110 (1998).
50. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,268.
51. See id. The ECOA and the FHA also prevent lenders from failing to provide
information or services regarding any aspect of the lending process, refusing to extend
credit, using different standards in determining whether to extend credit, or varying the
terms of credit offered. See id.
240 [Vol. 3
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taking enforcement or remedial action in the face of discriminatory
practices.52 Regarding remedies for fair lending violations, the Policy
Statement states that federal banking agencies have the authority to
seek "enforcement actions that may require both prospective and
retrospective relief," and "civil money penalties in varying amounts
against the financial institution or any institution-affliated party...
depending, among other things, on the nature of the violation and the
degree of culpability." 53  Other federal agencies associated with the
banking community also have enforcement authority under the ECOA
and the FHA.
4
Although the Policy Statement purports to provide guidance
and establish a clear standard for banking institutions to follow, the
Policy Statement does not confer any substantive or procedural rights
that a court could enforce in an administrative or civil proceeding. 5
Thus, without any federal enforcement power, litigation of these issues
persists, feeding the controversy as to the appropriate standard by
52. See id. at 18,270. The Policy Statement employs an interactive question and
answer format in its discussion of important issues. The Interagency Task Force arguably
utilizes this format in order to make the statement more accessible to the general public.
See id.
53. See id at 18,272. "Prospective relief may include requiring the financial
institution to adopt corrective policies and procedures," train relevant employees,
establish community programs to reach all sectors of a service area, "improve internal
audit controls," and monitor reports to the primary federal regulator. Id. at 18,272.
Retrospective relief may include identifying customers historically discriminated against
and instituting new incentive programs, making payments to injured parties, paying
restitution, damages, instituting other affirmative action programs as appropriate, and
requiring the financial institutions to pay civil money penalties to the United States
Treasury. See id. at 18,272-73. The National Credit Union Administration follows
similar criteria when addressing discrimination. See id. at 18,273.
54. See id. at 18,272. In certain situations, the Department of Justice, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development will also
have enforcement authority. See id.
55. See id. at 18,267. One commentator wrote, "[a]s a whole, the policy statement
improves the level of communication between banks and their governing agency regarding
fair-lending responsibilities, but further clarification is needed in the disparate impact and
self-testing areas." Kevin T. Kane, Statement on Lending Bias Leaves Key Issues
Unresolved, AM. BANKER, June 22, 1994, at 21 (Mr. Kane is President of CRA
Consultants Inc. in Boston and author of A Banker's Guide to the Community
Reinvestment Act: Case Studies of 33 Institutions). See generally Peter E. Mahoney, The
Ends of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 411 (1998) (discussing the complex
relationship between the fair lending laws applied in the Policy Statement and the
discrimination theories utilized in credit discrimination litigation).
1999] 241
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which to judge credit discrimination cases. 5 6 Rather than create a new
standard, many attorneys litigating these cases attempt to invoke the
McDonnell Douglas standard, set forth in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green. 7  In that case, a former employee alleged that his prior
employer's general hiring practices were racially motivated and
constituted a violation of Title VII.5 ' The plaintiff, Mr. Green, was a
mechanic and lab technician at McDonnell Douglas Corporation who
was discharged from his position during a periodic reduction in the
workforce. 9 Soon thereafter, Mr. Green began participating in illegal
civil rights protests directed against his former employer. When
McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for job candidates, Mr.
Green reapplied, only to be denied employment because of his civil
rights activism.61
Mr. Green filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, specifically relying on section 703(a)(1) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits discrimination based "on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" in any employment
decision.62 This landmark case proceeded all the way to the Supreme
Court, where Justice Powell, concisely defined the three-step
McDonnell Douglas test. 63  First, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving a prima facie case by showing: (1) he belongs to a racial
minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was
seeking applicants for; (3) that despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (4) thereafter, the employer continued to seek applicants
with plaintiff's qualifications. 64 Upon such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to state some legitimate and non-discriminatory
reason for its rejection of the employee. 65 The inquiry does not end
56. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5 h Cir. 1996); Latimore,
151 F.3d at 712; Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924 (8 h Cir. 1993).
57. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also infra notes 63-65
and accompanying text (discussing the prima facie discrimination standard).
58. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792.
59. See id. at 794.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 795.
62. See id. (citing The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).





there, however.16  Even if the employer purports to have a non-
discriminatory reason for its rejection of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may
demonstrate that the employer's stated reason for refusal of certain
rights was a mere pretext aimed at covering up discriminatory
67motive.
The relevant question in Latimore was whether the McDonnell
Douglas standard fit the fact patterns currently emerging in credit
discrimination litigation. 6' At least three circuits have held that it
should apply in some form. 69 In 1995, the Eighth Circuit recognized
the viability of the McDonnell Douglas standard in Ring v. First
Interstate Mortgage.70 In that case, plaintiff Bruce Ring, a real state
developer, brought claims under the FHA and the ECOA against First
Interstate Mortgage when the brokerage refused to provide long-term
financing for seven apartment buildings located in largely minority
areas. 7' The district court set forth the prima facie elements in a credit
discrimination case as follows: (1) plaintiff was a member of a
protected class; (2) he applied for and qualified for a loan from
defendants; (3) the loan was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4)
defendants continued to approve loans for applicants with
qualifications similar to those of plaintiff.72 The court explicitly
acknowledged the importance of the McDonnell Douglas standard in
FHA cases, specifically focusing on the HUD decision to adopt the
standard in 1992." 3 Interestingly, while the Eighth Circuit recognized
the McDonnell Douglas standard as a force in FHA and ECOA cases,
it subsequently ruled that it was not the appropriate standard to use at
the pleading stage of a lawsuit. 74
66. See id.
67. See id. at 804.
68. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712.
69. See id.; Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5"' Cir. 1996); Ring v.
First Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924 (8" Cir. 1993).
70. Ring, 984 F.2d at 926.
71. See id. at 925.
72. See id. at 926.
73. See id. In United States v. Badgett, the Eighth Circuit approved the use of the
McDonnell Douglas standard in FHA cases. United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176,
1178-79 (8"' Cir. 1992). The court based its holding on the policy of HUD, the regulatory
agency for the FHA, regarding usage of the McDonnell Douglas standard in this context.
See Ring, 984 F.2d at 926 n.2. See also 24 C.F.R. § 100.120 (1998) (discussing
qualifications for discrimination in real-estate lending).
74. See Ring, 984 F.2d at 927. The court held that "[w]hen a federal court reviews
1999] 243
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One year later, in Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, the Fifth
Circuit also utilized the McDonnell Douglas standard in a credit
discrimination context. 75  In that case, Gordon Simms, a white
landlord, contended that First Gibraltar bank committed a violation of
the FHA when it refused to issue him a commitment letter to replace
his existing loan with a new loan to finance a predominantly minority-
owned cooperative housing project. 76 Simms filed the claim in district
court with the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, alleging that First Gibraltar's denial
of the loan was racially motivated.77 Upon finding that the plaintiff
met his prima facie showing by utilizing the theories of disparate
treatment and disparate impact, the district court then shifted the
burden to the defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for
its refusal to issue a commitment letter.78 In response, First Gibraltar
stated it could not justify issuing the commitment letter to the plaintiff
when such an action would detrimentally affect the economic welfare
of the bank. 79  Finding this reason to be a mere pretext for racial
discrimination, the district court held for the plaintiff and granted
damages in excess of $3 million. 0
The Fifth Circuit, however, questioned the district court's
conclusion that First Girbraltar's decision was a mere pretext for racial
discrimination.8' The court of appeals noted that the plaintiff
"presented absolutely no evidence that other, 'non-protected'
applicants or applications were treated any differently around the time
the sufficiency of a complaint ... the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. at
926-27 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). See also Gilligan v. Jamco
Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9"' Cir. 1997) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas
standard is inappropriate at the pleading stage of a FHA lawsuit).
75. See Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (51h Cir. 1996).
76. See id. at 1548.
77. See id. at 1551.
78. See id. at 1553. During the trial, counsel for Simms asked Mr. Chastain, an asset
manager for Gibraltar Savings Association, to articulate "[w]hy he had declared that
Simms' failure to keep up the property was a reason for the rejection when neither he nor
any other employee of First Gibraltar had inspected the apartment complex." Id.
79. See id. at 1551-52. Specifically, the commitment letter "[w]ould diminish the
collateral securing First Gibraltar's loan on the apartment complex." Id. at 1551.
80. See id. at 1554. The jury awarded $1.21 million in compensatory damages and
$2 million in punitive damages. See id.
81. See id. at 1558.
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of Simms' rejection." 12 According to the Fifth Circuit, evidence that
would prove disparate treatment could include a pattern of loan bias on
the part of First Gibraltar Bank, statistics demonstrating a
disproportionate amount of loans granted to minority patrons in
relation to other patrons, or even examples of discriminatory conduct
on the part of specific personnel.8 3 In the absence of such factors, the
appellate court did not find racial animus behind the defendant's
refusal to issue a loan to plaintiff, and thus reversed the district court
decision. 4
Though not following the lead of Ring and Simms in the
lending discrimination context, the Seventh Circuit has invoked the
McDonnell Douglas standard in discrimination cases outside of
employment discrimination. 5 The Seventh Circuit, for instance, has
applied the McDonnell Douglas standard to cases involving age
discrimination as well as cases concerning discriminatory behavior
towards the disabled.8 6  In Leffel v. Valley Financial Services, the
plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that she was terminated from her
management position with Valley Financial Services as a result of her
disclosure that she suffered from multiple sclerosis.8 7 The Leffel court
recognized that the McDonnell Douglas standard originated in
employment discrimination cases.88  Nevertheless, the Court
proceeded along the same path of analysis, shaping the elements of a
plaintiffs prima facie case as follows: (1) plaintiff is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; 9 (2) her work performance met the
employer's legitimate expectations; (3) she was discharged; and (4)
82. Id. at 1558 (citing the standard in McDonnell Douglas).
83. See id. & n.34.
84. See id. at 1558-59.
85. See, e.g., Coco v. Elmwood Care Inc., 128 F.3d 1177 (7Th Cir. 1997) (allowing
the plaintiff to proceed under the McDonnell Douglas standard in a case involving the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)); Leffel v. Valley
Am. Bank, 113 F.3d 787 (7 h Cir. 1997) (analyzing the appropriateness of the McDonnell
Douglas standard in cases discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (1994)); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7"' Cir.
1997) (finding the McDonnell Douglas standard inappropriate in the context of the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994)).
86. See Coco, 128 F.3d at 1177; Leffel, 113 F.3d at 788.
87. Leffel, 113 F.3d at 789.
88. See id. at 792.
89. The Americans with Disabilities Act seeks to prevent discrimination based on an
individual's disability status. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
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"the circumstances surrounding her probation and discharge indicate
that it is more likely than not that her disability was the reason for
these adverse actions." 9" Utilizing the McDonnell Douglas standard of
review, the court held that the plaintiff, Ms. Leffel, did not meet the
burden of proof necessary to establish her prima facie case. 9
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals elected to use
the McDonnell Douglas standard in Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., a
case concerning the ADEA.92 Here, the plaintiff contended that he
was fired from his job at the defendant's nursing home due to his
age. 93 The primary issue in this case concerned the relationship
between the first element of the McDonnell Douglas standard requiring
a prima facie showing and the third element, affording the plaintiff an
opportunity to rebut the defendant's given reason for its alleged
discriminatory conduct. 94 The court ruled that the plaintiff did not
meet the "legitimate expectations" prong of the prima facie case due
to unsatisfactory job performance and thus, could not reach the third
part of the McDonnell Douglas test. 95  Without clear proof
demonstrating that the employer's legitimate expectations were met,
the court refused to draw an inference of discriminatory conduct on
the part of the defendant.
96
In contrast to the decisions in Leffel and Coco, the Seventh
Circuit in Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry declined to utilize the
McDonnell Douglas standard in a case involving an alleged violation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).97 In its opinion, the
90. Leffel, 113 F.3d at 794.
91. See id.
92. Coco, 128 F.3d at 1177. The ADEA seeks to prohibit discrimination based on an
individual's age. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C § 621(b) (1994).
93. See Coco, 128 F.3d at 1177.
94. See id. at 1179.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 1180. The court wrote
McDonnell Douglas is for cases in which an employee is performing in
a satisfactory manner but loses his job anyway and is replaced by
someone belonging to a different group from his own; in such a case
there is sufficient likelihood of discrimination to make it reasonable to
require the defendant to produce evidence of a noninvidious reason for
the 'discrimination.
Id. at 1180.
97. Diaz, 131 F.3d at 711. The FMLA grants a substantive entitlement to employees
to take a leave of absence due to pregnancy or family illness. Family and Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C § 2601 (1994).
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court distinguished between statutes that depend on discriminatory
conduct such as the ADA and the ADEA, and statutes that merely
create substantive entitlements such as the FMLA.98 Upon making this
distinction, the court concluded that the McDonnell Douglas standard
was only applicable to statutes based on discriminatory conduct. 99
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Common Factors in Lending Discrimination
The applicability of the McDonnell Douglas standard in the
credit discrimination context raises many questions, especially in light
of the varying viewpoints expressed within the circuits. For instance,
in Latimore, the Seventh Circuit adamantly opposed the use of the
standard.100 The Eighth Circuit, however, utilized the McDonnell
Douglas standard, using the same four elements necessary to establish
a prima facie case in a credit discrimination context, only to find fault
with the standard's role at the pleading stage of a lawsuit. 1 The Fifth
Circuit in Simms expressed a different opinion. 102 There, the court
applied the burden-shifting facet of the McDonnell Douglas standard to
a credit discrimination case, yet failed to adequately articulate what it
required in the way of a prima facie showing of evidence under a
disparate impact theory.'0 3 Yet, despite the differing opinions, these
cases discuss and analyze three common factors. Although approaches
and outcomes differ, the relevant circuits each analyzed the pertinent
statutory provisions and regulations, '04 the impact of the discrimination
theories on banking policy, 10 5 and the significance of a "competitive
98. See Diaz, 131 F.3d at 712. The court in Diaz pointed out similarities between the
FMLA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), where the
McDonnell Douglas standard was not applied. See id.
99. See id.
100. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712.
101. See Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8t' Cir. 1993).
102. Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5' Cir. 1996).
103. See id. at 1553
104. See infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text (analyzing the importance of
statutes and regulations in credit discrimination litigation).
105. In the Policy Statement, "the discrimination theories are divided into three
categories: overt discrimination, disparate treatment, and disparate impact." Policy
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interest" in credit discrimination lawsuits. 06
1. The Role of Statutory and Regulatory Law
The weight that the reviewing appellate court gave to the FHA
and the ECOA impacted whether the court accepted the McDonnell
Douglas standard in the context of lending discrimination. In
Latimore, for instance, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the
plaintiff brought suit under both the FHA and the ECOA, yet it paid
very little attention to the language and intent behind those statutes in
considering whether or not the McDonnell Douglas standard of review
was appropriate.' 07 Indeed, when counsel for the plaintiff attempted to
invoke the statutory language imposing potential liability on the
appraiser, the Seventh Circuit reacted adversely, even threatening
sanctions for the filing of a frivolous lawsuit. 108 The Latimore court
refused to find any support, explicit or implicit, for the McDonnell
Douglas standard within the FHA or the ECOA.
Conversely, in each decision permitting the use of the
McDonnell Douglas standard, the court in question carefully dissected
the particular statute or regulation, searching for guidance.0 9 The
district court in Latimore, for example, first analyzed the intent behind
the FHA and the ECOA before allowing the McDonnell Douglas
analysis to proceed." ° The court held that under both the FHA and
the ECOA, a plaintiff must show that race was the motivating factor
Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18, 268 (1994). See also
infra notes 120-141 and accompanying text (analyzing the role of the discrimination
theories in credit discrimination litigation).
106. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (analyzing the importance of a
"competitive interest" in credit discrimination litigation).
107. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.
108. See id. at 716. Despite the language in the FHA permitting an inquiry into the
appraiser's conduct, the court explained that because "the bank's lawyers... do not ask
for sanctions for the filing of a frivolous claim against Kernbauer, we shall let the matter
drop with a warning that this court does not look with favor on the promiscuous joinder of
minor employees as defendants in cases against their employers." Id.
109. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1559 (5 h Cir. 1996)
(scrutinizing the interactions between the FHA and the ECOA in relation to the
McDonnell Douglas standard); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th
Cir. 1993) (interpreting significant parts of the Fair Housing Act in its analysis of the
McDonnell Douglas standard).
110. Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 664.
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behind a defendant's decision to refuse a loan.11 ' The district court
further explained exactly what types of conduct each statute forbids,
only then finding the McDonnell Douglas standard consistent with
these goals."
2
Similarly, in the Ring and Simms cases, both the FHA and the
ECOA were carefully scrutinized." 3 In Ring, the Eighth Circuit laid
out substantive portions of the FHA to determine what may survive a
Rule 12 inquiry." 4 The opinion concluded that there is "no doubt that
the three-stage McDonnell Douglas... analysis applies to Fair
Housing Act cases." "s In the following footnote, the court noted that
"HUD, the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the Fair
Housing Act, has adopted this test to evaluate claims of discrimination
under the Act, and we have approved that standard." " 6 Finally, in
Simms, the Fifth Circuit also carefully scrutinized the FHA and ECOA
despite ultimately ruling against the plaintiff. "' The Simms court
carefully parsed relevant portions of both statutory provisions in an
effort to determine the veracity of the defendant's stated reason for
denial of the plaintiff's loan under part three of the McDonnell
Douglas standard."' The court concluded that
[t]he FHA does not create a cause of action for
bungling a deal, failing to follow industry custom,
violating the ECOA, or even making false
representations to a government agency. . . [t]he FHA
instead prohibits a lending institution from using race,
or any other prohibited factor, as a basis for making a
111. See id. at 664.
112. See id. The FHA prohibits discriminatory conduct in real estate transactions.
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994). The ECOA prohibits discriminatory conduct
in any aspect of a credit transaction. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691
(1994).
113. Simms, 83 F.3d at 1559; Ring, 984 F.2d at 926.
114. Ring, 984 F.2d at 926.
115. Id.
116. Id. n.2 (citing United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8' Cir. 1992)).
117. Simms, 83 F.3d at 1559. The court stated that its holding was very narrow and
simple, leaving the door open for plaintiffs with more viable claims. See id.
Unfortunately, even in the Fifth Circuit, it is unclear exactly what evidence the court
requires in order to reach a verdict for the plaintiff.
118. See id.
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lending decision." 9
Although discussion of the statutes is a part of all these
pertinent cases, a trend emerges: the closer the attention paid to the
language and intent behind the FHA and the ECOA, the more likely
the court was to accept the McDonnell Douglas standard.
2. The Role of the Discrimination Theories
Turning to the next common theme, many of the circuits
discussing credit discrimination focused some attention on the theories
of disparate treatment and disparate impact in relation to the
McDonnell Douglas standard. 2  A plaintiff may claim disparate
treatment when she is treated differently from other applicants based
on a prohibited factor, such as race or sex. 12' Disparate impact cases
occur where a policy, neutral on its face, has a discriminatory effect
on members of a protected class. 1
22
Although these two theories are discussed and analyzed in all
three circuits, the circuits are split as to how they relate to the
McDonnell Douglas standard. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, treats
disparate impact as an integral part of the third stage of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis in the Simms case. 123 The district court in Simms
instructed the jury on both theories while simultaneously utilizing the
McDonnell Douglas test. 124 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the
bank's policy regarding funding for cooperative housing led to
unwanted discriminatory impact on potential minority owners of the
co-op in a largely minority neighborhood. 25 The district court used
the McDonnell Douglas structure to identify the evidence of these
disparate effects, ultimately holding that the bank's alleged "economic
119. Id.
120. See Simms, 83 F.3d at 1546 passim; Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712 passim; Gilligan
v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246 passim (9h Cir. 1997).
121. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,268
(1994).
122. See id. at 18,268 (giving detailed explanations and examples of each
discrimination theory).
123. Simms, 83 F.3d at 1554.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1551.
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sense" rationale only masked the racial animus lurking under the
surface. 126 Although the Fifth Circuit reversed, it upheld the district
court's use of discrimination theories in conjunction with the
controversial McDonnell Douglas analysis. 1
27
The second approach arises in both the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits where the courts drew a decisive line between the
discrimination theories and the. McDonnell Douglas standard. 128  In
Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corporation, the Ninth Circuit did not
allow the McDonnell Douglas standard to proceed during the pleading
stage, yet the Court still recognized the viability of a disparate impact
claim under the FHA.1 9 In its discussion of the McDonnell Douglas
standard, the Gilligan court wrote, "[w]e agree with the Ring court's
statement that it is inappropriate, for 'practical reasons', to 'measure a
plaintiff's complaint against a particular formation of the prima facie
case at the pleading stage."" 30  Arguably, courts have continued to
recognize disparate impact claims because the Policy Statement
established the appropriateness of such claims in cases of credit
discrimination. 3'
In contrast, no comparable authority exists for asserting the
McDonnell Douglas standard. The district court in Gilligan, however,
correlated a prima facie showing of evidence under the McDonnell
Douglas standard with a similar showing of a disparate impact on the
part of the defendant. 32 The court remarked that "the Gilligans allege
that they are members of a class protected under the FHA, identify a
policy that affects only members of that class, and set forth facts that
126. See id. at 1554. During the trial, Mr Smith, an expert for the plaintiff, admitted
that First Gibraltar would not issue a commitment letter if it did not make "economic
sense." Id.
127. See id. at 1555.
128. See Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924 passim (8' Cir. 1993);
Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246 passim (9"' Cir. 1997).
129. Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 250. The Ninth Circuit articulated two primary reasons for
its decision not to apply the McDonnell Douglas standard at the pleading stage of a
lawsuit. First, the court pointed out that an evidentiary standard is inappropriate at the
pleading stage according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. Second, the
court found fault with the mechanical application of the McDonnell Douglas standard in
every credit discrimination case. See id. (citing Ring, 984 F.2d at 927).
130. Id. at 249 (quoting Ring, 984 F.2d at 927).
131. See See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266,
passim (1994).
132. See Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 248.
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demonstrate the enforcement of that policy in the form of actions
prohibited by the FHA." 133 Thus, the element of the prima facie case
helped establish how the policy in question had a discriminatory effect
on the Gilligans. 1
34
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit failed to uphold the close
relationship between the McDonnell Douglas test and the theory of
disparate impact, stating that "the failure to plead financial
qualifications [under a prima facie showing] does not diminish the
Gilligans' additional disparate impact claim. This statement
illustrates the Ninth Circuit's reluctance to go beyond the actual text of
the FHA and allow the McDonnell Douglas analysis to proceed.
As evidenced by the previous discussion of existing caselaw,
the circuits continue to struggle in their quest to achieve the correct
balance between the discrimination theories and the McDonnell
Douglas standard. 136 Notably, however, all of the circuits analyzing
these cases at least attempt to strike a balance between the two, either
by incorporating these theories into the McDonnell Douglas analysis or
by leaving the theories as potential claims for the plaintiff. 131 In either
scenario, the plaintiff has some recourse to pursue.
In Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, the Seventh
Circuit relied on a different analysis of the discrimination theories in
relation to the McDonnell Douglas standard of review. The Latimore
court failed to mention either the disparate treatment or disparate
impact theory, at least by name. 13  Upon a closer reading of the
opinion, however, it looks as if the court chose to adopt a disparate
treatment standard of review in favor of the McDonnell Douglas
standard when it wrote, "it is always open to a plaintiff in a
discrimination case to try to show in a conventional way, without
relying on any special doctrines of burden-shifting, that there is
enough evidence, direct or circumstantial, of discrimination to create a
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 250.
136. See supra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.
137. See Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5t' Cir. 1996); Ring v. First
Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924 (8' Cir. 1993); Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108
F.3d 246 (9t' Cir. 1997).
138. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 715.
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triable issue." 3 9  This remark aptly summarizes the definition of
disparate treatment set forth in the Policy Statement. 140 Later in the
opinion, the court also alluded to the theory of disparate impact when
it discusses why Ms. Latimore does not attack the bank's 75 % rule on
grounds that it created the potential for discriminatory effects. 141
Nevertheless, the Latimore court, led by Chief Judge Posner, elected
to take the most conservative path, without effectively analyzing how
other circuits have blended the traditional discrimination theories with
the emerging McDonnell Douglas standard in credit discrimination
cases.
3. The Role of "Competitive Interest"
The final issue addressed by the circuits concerns the presence
or absence of a "competitive interest." The primary reason that the
Latimore court rejected the McDonnell Douglas standard in lending
discrimination cases was that the minority plaintiffs were not in direct
"competition" with whites for a limited number of loans. 142 To
illustrate its point, the court examined the employment discrimination
fact pattern in which the relevant standard originated. The court stated
that
in a typical case of employment discrimination,
involving the say denial of a promotion to a black
employee, the plaintiff would have to show only that he
was qualified for the promotion and that a white got it
instead, and the burden would then be on the employer
to come forth with a noinvidious reason for why the
white rather than the black got the promotion. 143
139. Id. at 715.
140. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,268
(1994).
141. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 715. Arguably, plaintiff's counsel could have tried to
prove disparate impact by arguing that the bank's rule requiring no more than a 75% ratio
of the appraised value of Ms. Latimore's home to the amount of the loan has unwanted
effects on minority borrowers taken as a whole.
142. See id. at 715.
143. Id. at 713.
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The court concluded that this competitive situation is missing
with allegations of credit discrimination, explaining that "a bank does
not announce, '[w]e are making a $51,000 real estate loan today;
please submit your applications, and we'll choose the application that
we like the best and give that applicant the loan."''" In other words,
there is no squaring off between a minority and non-minority
consumer attempting to obtain the same real estate loan. Thus,
without the necessary causal link created by a "competitive interest,"
the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the McDonnell Douglas standard.
In Simms, the Fifth Circuit also addressed the lack of
competitive interest between the plaintiff and other non-protected
applicants. Yet, it still permitted the burden-shifting McDonnell
Douglas methodology to proceed. 45 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
the lack of competitive interest in lending discrimination cases
supported the defendant's refusal to make the cooperative housing loan
under the second step of the McDonnell Douglas standard. 146 Thus,
even if the plaintiff established a prima facie case for lending
discrimination, the fact that the minority plaintiff was not competing
for the loan with other non-minority applicants adds credence to the
defendant's claim that its refusal to make the loan was not racially
motivated. 147
B. Application of the McDonnell Douglas Standard
In a recent study by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, researchers found that African-Americans are denied
mortgages at twice the rate of whites. 41 Such alarming statistics
emphasize the need for a unified judicial approach to credit
discrimination litigation. First, however, leaders in the financial
community should take a closer look at the forces behind
144. See id. at 714. Arguably, however, the Seventh Circuit misses a step in its
analysis by not considering the fact that although whites do not directly compete with
blacks for loans, banks only have finite reserves to make loans. Thus, in one sense, loan
applicants do compete for limited bank resources.
145. See Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (5"' Cir. 1996).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Massive HUD 'Paired Testing' Initiative, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Nov.
30, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File (citing the Department of
Housing and Urban Development Secretary, Andrew Cuomo).
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discrimination in lending and banking institutions. One commentator
grouped these discriminatory forces into four principle categories. 49
First, social norms, reflecting the possibility of decreased property
value, govern whether lenders will support a loan to a black family
trying to purchase a home in a predominantly white neighborhood. ' 50
In keeping with the coercive nature of social norms, there are also
fears that the practice of redlining still survives in the United States.'
Redlining occurs when bankers or other lenders make the decision not
to issue loans to entire minority neighborhoods.' 52  Second,
discrimination in lending institutions may persist due to an "animus or
taste for discrimination." ' This term refers to the fact that bank
employees will work harder for the white, non-minority applicant. 154
Indeed, in Latimore, plaintiff's counsel attempted to argue this point to
no avail.' 55  Third, "rational discrimination" exists in the
marketplace. 56  Swire defines this concept as, "statistical
discrimination which involves the use of a general category, such as
race or neighborhood, to reduce the costs of particularized inquiry into
an individual's creditworthiness .... [I]t also refers to lenders' profit
enhancing decisions taken in light of strategic assessment of the
actions of other lenders." 157 Arguably, the court in Simms allowed
this type of lending discrimination to continue when it accepted the
bank's "economic sense" rationale as the reason behind the bank's
refusal to grant a loan for the first cooperative housing project in the
149. See Swire, supra note 1, at 789.
150. See id. at 814.
151. See id. at 800.
152. The problem of redlining is especially worrisome because it interjects
discrimination into the FHA, the very legislation that was designed to prevent
discrimination. In the 1940s and 1950s, the FHA consistently doled out the lowest
neighborhood ratings to minority neighborhoods and refused to grant housing insurance to
minorities except in minority neighborhoods. Professor Swire argued that lasting damage
was done when banks and savings and loan institutions institutionalized the practice of
denying mortgages. See id.; see also Marcus, supra note 28, at 710 (discussing the
concept of redlining).
153. Swire, supra note 1, at 816-17.
154. See id.
155. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 715-16. Ms. Latimore contended that Citibank's
employee, Ms. Lundberg, worked harder to get higher appraisal values for white
borrowers similarly situated to Ms. Latimore. The court, however, concluded that Ms.
Lundberg exhibited no favoritism toward white borrowers. See id.
156. See Swire, supra note 1, at 821.
157. Id.
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area. 15' Finally, Swire argued that the "investment in human capital
or creditworthiness" was a reason for discrimination. 59 This
discussion alludes to the fact that minorities have more difficulty than
whites in establishing creditworthiness over time and over
generations. '60
In light of the forces still at work in the banking and lending
communities, the question of the suitability of the McDonnell Douglas
standard in credit discrimination cases remains. The standard has
worked effectively in the areas of employment discrimination, age
discrimination, and disability discrimination and proponents of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis urge the implementation of the standard
in credit discrimination cases as well.' 6' The McDonnell Douglas test
presents a very workable structure by creating three distinct steps for a
plaintiff and defendant to follow when litigating these cases. 61 If a
plaintiff cannot adequately establish a prima facie showing, the case is
over. 163  By alerting parties to their respective burdens, the test
promotes time and cost efficiency.
In Latimore, the Seventh Circuit articulated a number of
reasons for rejecting the McDonnell Douglas standard in loan bias
cases, noting that "the Supreme Court has reminded us that
McDonnell Douglas was not intended to be a straitjacket into which
158. See Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1557 (5 h Cir. 1996).
159. Swire, supra note 1, at 825.
160. See id. at 826. The debate over the practice of credit scoring has recently brought
attention to the plight of minorities trying to establish a credit history. See Hala Habal,
Credit Scoring Questioned as Minority Loan Criterion, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 1998, at 12.
Some argue that credit scoring, which relies solely on past credit history in making loans,
presents a problem for minority applicants with little to no prior history. See id. In an
effort to address this problem, Fannie Mae, a congressionally chartered mortgage
company, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
have formed a partnership to provide financing options for families who cannot afford
large down payments. See Marcy Gordon, Mortgage Plan to Aid Blacks, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Jan. 22, 1999, at 15A. The goal of the program is to allow African-
Americans to become homeowners "without discrimination, without exclusion and without
needless barriers and burdens." Id.
161. See Coco v. Elmwood Care Inc., 128 F.3d 1177 (7"h Cir. 1997); Leffel v. Valley
Am. Bank, 113 F.3d 787 (7' Cir. 1997).
162. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
163. It is important to reiterate the fact that in Latimore, the defendant, Citibank
Federal Savings Bank, also supported application of the McDonnell Douglas standard. See




every discrimination case must be forced kicking and screaming." 164
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit pointed out two primary weaknesses
of applying the McDonnell Douglas standard to credit discrimination
cases. First, the court argued that on the facts of Latimore and other
loan bias cases, it would be difficult to show that the bank
discriminated against Ms. Latimore when it appraised her home at an
amount disproportionate to the loan amount she sought without first
finding a white borrower in the same position for purposes of
comparison."' However, the Seventh Circuit left the door open for
situations in which the McDonnell Douglas standard may be
appropriate.166 The court held that
at the heart of McDonnell Douglas is the idea that if the
black is treated worse than the white [and] there is no
obvious reason for the difference in treatment,...
there is something for the employer to explain; and
although the competitive situation which invites and
facilitates comparison is usually missing from credit
discrimination cases, sometimes there will be another
basis for comparison.167
Opponents of the McDonnell Douglas standard in lending
discrimination cases also point to the inevitable procedural difficulties
in implementing the standard. The Latimore court was especially
concerned with the burden-shifting facet of the standard and its role in
creating "precomplaint discovery." 168 The court disagreed with
164. Id.
165. See id. at 715.
166. See id.
167. Id. The court discussed what might constitute an acceptable basis for comparison
by creating a hypothetical situation.
Suppose Ii Latimore and Eromital (who is white) apply at roughly the
same time for roughly the same-sized loan from the same Citibank
office. The two prospective borrowers are equally creditworthy and
the collateral they offer to put up is appraised at the same amount.
Both applications are forwarded to Ms. Lundberg and she turns down
Latimore's application and approves Eromital's.
Id. If confronted with this fact pattern, the court suggested that they would apply the
McDonnell Douglas standard. See id.
168. Pre-complaint discovery occurs when a court shifts the burden of proof onto the
defendant before requiring the plaintiff to present some evidence showing that the
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immediately shifting the burden to the defendant upon a prima facie
showing by the plaintiff, stating, "it is not enough that the essential
evidence is in the defendant's possession and would be difficult for the
plaintiff, even with the aid of modem pre-trial discovery, to dig out of
the defendant." 69  Essentially, the Latimore court required the
plaintiff to put on more evidence of discrimination than the McDonnell
Douglas standard required before proceeding to discovery. Arguably,
this approach to credit discrimination is time and cost efficient for
overburdened courts since it attempts to weed out frivolous lawsuits.
Conversely, this approach may prevent worthy plaintiffs from ever
reaching the necessary discovery period.
V. CONCLUSION
Recently, banking institutions and other commercial lenders
have sought to find a viable solution for remedying the pervasive
problem of credit discrimination. One alternative to litigating these
cases is to utilize the testing procedure described in the Policy
Statement. 170 The testing alternative pairs minority and non-minority
applicants and asks them to apply to the same lender. 1'' Different
outcomes are then used as proof of discrimination. 172 The theory
relies on the idea that bankers and other lending institutions will be
more careful to establish non-discriminatory policies and practices if
they are afraid of being caught by testers. 173 However, some common
problems associated with this alternative to litigation include increased
costs due to detailed credit checks and strict scrutiny of property
defendant violated the plaintiff's right. See id. at 714.
169. Id.
170. In its discussion of self-testing, the Interagency Taskforce comments that "lenders
should employ reliable measures for auditing fair lending compliance. A well-designed
and implemented program of self-testing could be a valuable part of this process." See
Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,270 (1994). See
also Massive HUD 'Paired Testing Initiative, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, Nov. 30, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File (discussing the HUD decision to fund a
nationwide test of housing discrimination); MBA Funds Research Institute, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Nov. 23, 1998, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File
(discussing the Mortgage Bankers of America initiative to expand home ownership
opportunities for minorities).





appraisals, self-regulation by the very entities being investigated, and
finally, a fear of false positives. 174 Due to these and other concerns,
banks have been very cautious about implementing large scale testing
programs. 7
Litigation remains a principle remedy for the problem of
discrimination in lending. Thus far, however, lawsuits have not
proven particularly effective, with only the most blatant instances of
discrimination surviving summary judgment motions. 176 Arguably,
this result is due in part to the inconsistency behind decisions such as
Latimore and Simms in the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, respectively. 1
77
In Latimore, for instance, the court ignores several principle issues.
First, while it is certainly true that refusal to allow the McDonnell
Douglas standard does eliminate the potential of frivolous lawsuits, it
also prevents plaintiffs from reaching the vital discovery stage. The
court does not adequately address how plaintiffs can meet their heavy
evidentiary burden without the benefit of discovery. Conversely, the
McDonnell Douglas standard enables plaintiffs to put on a minimal
showing and then shift the burden to the party with all the
information. 17  Also, under the McDonnell Douglas method, the
defendant still has the opportunity to prevail by producing enough
evidence demonstrating non-discriminatory motive. 179 This
proposition is sufficiently illustrated by Simms v. First Gibralter Bank
in the Fifth Circuit. 80 Second, the Latimore court overlooked the
relevance of the statutes and regulations pertaining to discrimination in
real estate and lending transactions. 8' Significantly, the court failed to
174. See id.
175. Banks have also been cautious out of fear that data discovered during self-testing
will not be shielded from disclosure during discovery. See Policy Statement on
Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,268.
176. See Swire, supra note 1, at 830.
177. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714 (holding that the McDonnell Douglas standard is
inappropriate in most credit discrimination cases). But see Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank,
83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (51h Cir. 1996) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas standard in the credit
discrimination context).
178. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
179. See id.
180. Simms, 83 F.3d 1546 passim.
181. For statutes on point, see the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1968) and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994). Regulations pertaining to this
legislation were adopted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 24
C.F.R. § 100.110 (1998), and the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1998).
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recognize that HUD, the regulatory agency responsible for
enforcement of the FHA, adopted the McDonnell Douglas standard to
evaluate claims of discrimination under the FHA. 182 Finally, the court
asserted a lack of "competitive interest" in the credit discrimination
context yet declined to pursue this line of analysis to a more accurate
conclusion. In fact, there is a "competitive interest" running through
these cases since banks have a finite amount of money to loan out and
consumers compete for loans out of this limited pool.
Without the uniformity provided by the McDonnell Douglas
standard, principal issues will continue to be ignored and the
inconsistency of lending discrimination decisions will continue.
Consequently, some worthy plaintiffs might refrain from litigating
their cases. Hopefully, the United States Supreme Court will see fit to
grant certiorari for a credit discrimination case in the near future.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in both the Ring and
Simms lawsuits, and certiorari was not sought in the Latimore case. 8 3
Although procedural and policy considerations abound for and against
the McDonnell Douglas standard, ultimately, only the Supreme Court
can end the controversy and provide guidance for plaintiffs and
defendants alike in the credit discrimination context.
ERIN ELISABETH DANCY
182. See Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, 984 F.2d 924, 926 & n.2 (8"' Cir. 1993)
(citing United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8" Cir. 1992)).
183. Ring v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n., 118 S. Ct. 1189 (1998); Simms v. First
Madison Bank, 117 S. Ct. 610 (1996).
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